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The gist of Professor Brilmayer's article is that American courts, in
applying American law extraterritorially, have fallen into a "methodological
trap."' Purporting to construe legislation that is silent about its territorial
and personal scope, they have invoked a fictitious "congressional intent" and
presumptions of their own making to give American regulatory enactments an
overly expansive reach. Professor Brilmayer maintains that these excessive
assertions of legislative jurisdiction cannot easily be remedied. Since they are
ostensibly premised on a legislative intent, judges lack the freedom to take
corrective action which they enjoy in dealing with the common law. To curtail
extraterritoriality, they would have to substitute their own judgment for that
which they have imputed to Congress. In consequence, Professor Brilmayer
concludes, U.S. courts now adhere to rigid quasi-statutory approaches that
overstate domestic interests and are indifferent to foreign policy concerns.
To promote greater flexibility and deference to the interests of other nations,
she advocates a greater reliance on the Constitution, more specifically the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Noting similarities to domestic
conflicts problems, she argues that the due process clause can help to
extricate the judiciary from its self-inflicted dilemma, although-until now-
litigants and judges have rarely invoked due process as a constraint on the
extraterritorial reach of American regulatory laws.
II
IDENTIFYING A NON-PROBLEM
Professor Brilmayer correctly observes that judicial recourse to an
unexpressed legislative intent in determining the reach of domestic law
amounts to mere windowdressing. The problem of how far a statute may
reach arises precisely because the legislature failed to deal with the issue of
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extraterritoriality. It is doubtless correct to say that when courts profess to
honor the wishes of Congress, they in fact follow their own normative views
concerning the desirable scope of American regulatory legislation. It is
difficult, however, to accept Professor Brilmayer's proposition that such
transparent cover-ups seriously compromise a court's ability to change an
erroneous "construction" in the light of later and, one hopes, better insights.
Few federal judges, after confessing error (either their own or that of their
predecessors), would perpetuate the mistake merely because the earlier
decision pretended to rest, in whole or in part, on statutory construction.
Not only does Professor Brilmayer fail to adduce empirical evidence to
support her view, cases such as Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N. T. &
S.A. 2 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.3 show that assumptions
about congressional intent are not likely to inhibit courts from making foreign
policy judgments. The opinions in these cases also demonstrate that the
concern about insensitivity to the interests of foreign nations is overdrawn.
As for the future, one may expect that courts will cite the proposed section
403 of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law, 4 which counsels
restraint in the application of domestic regulatory laws to foreign parties and
transactions, just as they have cited its predecessor, section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. 5 Since the shopping list of
considerations contained in these provisions is exceedingly open-ended and
amorphous, worries about the lack of judicial "elbow room" seem quite
unwarranted.
Also, it is doubtful whether American assertions of legislative jurisdiction
are truly exorbitant. Although Professor Brilmayer's article is not altogether
clear on that point, it appears that she rejects the objective territoriality
principle 6 established by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America. 7 She prefers some unspecified set of multilateralist
principles8 that would presumably discard the criterion of anticompetitive
impact on the American market. Such a change, however, would probably
violate legislative intent, for Congress has expressly endorsed the effects test.
Moreover, to eliminate that basis of legislative jurisdiction would put
American practices at odds with those followed by some of its major foreign
trading partners. The Alcoa test has been enshrined in section 98, paragraph
2, of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition,' which
2. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
3. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
4. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).
6. See Brilmayer, supro note 1, at 14, 16-24.
7. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 21-22.
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982).
10. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschr'a'nkugen ofJulv 27, 1957, BGBI. 1 1081. Paragraph 2 of
section 98 provides as follows:
This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition that have effects within the territory in which
this Act applies, even if such effects are caused by activities outside such territory.
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demonstrates that the handiwork of legislatures is not necessarily superior to
judicial lawmaking. The same criterion has since been adopted by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities with respect to the extraterritorial
reach of the Common Market's antitrust rules."
III
PROPOSING A NON-SOLUTION
My disagreement with Professor Brilmayer's contribution is not limited to
her assessment of the ills of extraterritoriality; it extends to what she proposes
as a therapy. Relying on parallels to domestic conflict of laws problems, she
proffers the due process clause of the fifth amendment as a remedy. The
problem of extraterritoriality, however, transcends our own body politic; it is
a matter of international rather than merely national concern. Domestic law
alone may therefore not suffice to provide a cure to what ails current
American practice. In addition, the manner in which the United States
Supreme Court has dealt with jurisdiction and choice of law suggests that
faith in the Court's ability to fashion principles that would resolve problems
created by the overlap of domestic and foreign legislation may be misplaced.
First, a word about the asserted similarities between interstate conflicts
and the international clash of regulatory policies. The problems presented by
such enactments as antitrust and securities legislation are quite different from
run-of-the-mill conflicts questions. Conflicts approaches start from the
premise that both the lexfori and foreign law are entitled to a roll of the dice at
the choice-of-law table. (This is true even of interest analysis, although the
analysts are wont to load the dice heavily in favor of forum law.' 2) In contrast,
regulatory statutes do not pose the issue whether the lexfori or some other law
should be applied. Rather, the court is asked to decide whether to enforce the
domestic statute or to dismiss the case. As Professor Brilmayer notes, the
issue is "jurisdictional,"' l3 because courts assume that they may not choose to
apply foreign law. Accordingly, the propriety of drawing an analogy between
the law of conflicts and the extraterritorial application of regulatory
enactments is questionable.
11. See, e.g., Tepea v. Commission of the European Communities, 1978 E. COMM. CT. J. REP.
1391; Bguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, 1971 C.J. COMm. E. 949. Henri Mayras.
Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European Communities, frankly acknowledged the
Common Market's indebtedness to American notions of legislative jurisdiction. Addressing the
court in a case involving the alleged extraterritorial application of the Communities' antitrust law, he
cited various American decisions and said:
Naturally, it is in American anti-trust law and especially in the case-law summarized in the
'Restatement of Foreign Relations Law' that one finds the clearest and most fully elaborated
material concerning the criterion of the territorial application of competition law.
Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1972 E. COMM. CT. J. REP.
619, 690.
12. See generallYJuenger, Coiflict of Laws: A Critique oflnterestAnalysis, 32 AM.J. CoMP. L. 1. 10-13,
37-39 (1984).
13. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 13.
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Furthermore, while governmental interests in domestic choice-of-law cases
are tenuous, if not entirely lacking,' 4 no one questions the reality of foreign
and domestic interests that are at loggerheads when, for instance, the United
States proceeds against restrictive trade practices that are lawful in the
defendant's home country.' 5 While state attorneys general have rarely
intervened in conflicts cases,' 6 litigation involving the extraterritorial reach of
regulatory laws has provoked diplomatic protests, amicus briefs by foreign
governments, as well as foreign protective or retaliatory legislation. 17 In
marked contrast, most interstate conflicts cases do not present fundamental
disagreements on policy. As Judge Weinstein pointed out in a well-known
multistate case, within the United States major policy differences are rare
because shared values as well as a common language and legal education
assure a high degree of homogeneity. 18 Further, state "sovereignty" in our
federal system is hardly comparable to the prerogatives enjoyed by
independent nations. Accordingly, the divergences of basic policies among
nations with different social, economic, and political systems, which enliven
the debate of extraterritoriality, are noticeably absent in interstate conflicts
cases.
Even if the conflicts analogy suggested by Professor Brilmayer were
appropriate, the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements in conflicts
cases inspire little confidence that the Justices, resorting to the due process
clause, will better address the problems presented by extraterritorial
regulatory assertions than judges who purport to divine congressional intent.
The Court's opinions on interstate judicial jurisdiction, for instance, are far
from satisfactory. Well over forty years after International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,19 the meanings of such phrases as "minimum contacts ' 20 and
"fair play and substantial justice" 21 remain unclear. The Court's more recent
shibboleths, "purposeful availment" 22 and "purposeful direction," 23 have not
introduced greater certainty. In fact, the advance sheets are full of
jurisdictional opinions, most of them long, heavily footnoted, and
14. See Juenger, supra note 12, at 29-30, 35-37.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,352 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
16. But see Brief of Nevada, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of California, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1977).
17. For an illustrative discussion of foreign reactions to the extraterritorial application of
American antitrust law, see 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
100-05 (2d ed. 1981); Note, Reassessment of International Application of Antitrust Laws: Blocking Statutes,
Balancing Tests, and Treble Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 197.
18. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id. at 316.
21. Id.
22. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Ct.,
436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978). The "purposeful availment" test was first used in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
23. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). Both terms of phrase are used interchangeably in Asahi Metal Indus.
v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033 (1987).
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accompanied by dissents, in which state and federal courts struggle to apply
these slippery concepts to concrete cases as best they can. 24 Their
befuddlement is understandable, for not only the Supreme Court's
terminology, but its reading of the Constitution has vacillated. Thus, the
Volkswagen case says that the due process clause of the Civil War amendment,
operating as an "instrument of interstate federalism," protects state
sovereignty.2 5  The Court has since retreated from that astonishing
proposition.2 6 But the Justices have never told us whether and how the
Court's change of perception affects the precedential value of its earlier
decisions, which state and federal courts continue to cite with scant regard for
the fact that their foundations have been undermined.2 7
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on choice of law are no more
satisfactory than its jurisdictional opinions. While the question whether the
courts of a particular state can hear a case ought to find a relatively easy
answer, choice-of-law issues are notoriously difficult. Accordingly it is not
surprising that the Court, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,28 took a hands-off
stance. If the scholarly reaction, reflected in two symposia, 2 9 is any indication,
that case was a disappointment. What do the divergent opinions in Allstate
have to offer on the question of extraterritoriality? How can they help
unclutter the international overlap of regulatory laws? Except for Justice
Stevens, the Court failed even to differentiate between due process and full
faith and credit. Yet these two clauses have entirely different purposes: One
protects individual rights, the other system values. Furthermore, while the
due process clause may matter in international cases, the full faith and credit
clause does not. Lumping them together hardly facilitates analysis, especially
if the problem to be analyzed is as complex as that of extraterritoriality. The
simple idea on which the entire Court agreed in Allstate, that the defendant
must have some contact with the forum to justify the application of forum
laws, does nothing to dispel the confusion that characterizes the current
American conflicts law. Nor does that idea add anything to the lore of
legislative jurisdiction, which, after all, proceeds from the very same premise.
If it is fair to draw conclusions from what has happened in the fields of
jurisdiction and choice of law, it seems that recourse to constitutional tenets-
that is, a greater measure of Supreme Court intervention-is unlikely to
resolve the problems engendered by the extraterritorial application of
domestic regulatory laws. If the Justices should feel that their wisdom
24. See, e.g., Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 431(1986); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
25. 444 U.S. at 294.
26. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03
(1982).
27. See cases cited supra note 24.
28. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
29. Choice of Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1981);
Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: From Shaffer to Allstate, 14 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 837 (1981).
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surpasses that of other judges, they may choose to exercise it by granting
petitions for review. The subject matter being federal in nature, there is no
need to resort to the Constitution in order to correct whatever mistakes lower
courts may make in international cases. Instead of providing flexibility, a
quality Professor Brilmayer finds desirable, 30 Supreme Court decisions that
rest on constitutional grounds, even if they are phrased in such loose terms as
"minimum contacts," introduce a measure of rigidity. Once the Court has
spoken, the discretion of inferior tribunals is severely limited; they can no
longer rely on their own sights but must guess, as best they can, what the
supreme bench would do with the case at hand. Such speculation, far from
improving justice in transnational cases, would merely add yet another layer
of complexity to an already intricate subject.
The subject of extraterritoriality is surely intricate. Looking at the rich
case law and literature dealing with the questions that are the topic of this
colloquium, and at the Reporters' valiant efforts to codify these materials in
the Foreign Relations Law Restatements, brings to mind the words of an
eminent member of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Long ago, Judge Porter
complained that
the vast mass of learning . . . leaves the subject . . . enveloped in obscurity and
doubt ....
When . . .so many. . . men, of great talents and learning, are thus found to fail in
fixing certain principles, we are forced to conclude that they have failed, not from want




What is the source of this obscurity and doubt? Perhaps Professor
Brilmayer should have looked for the "methodological dead end" 32 in a
different place. More serious than the reliance on a fictive congressional
intent is the ingrained habit of using the concept of "legislative jurisdiction"
as a guide for decisionmaking. Among lawyers, "jurisdiction" is a very
popular word; we all recall learning it as part of our initiation rites during the
first year of law school. It appeals to legal minds because it has four syllables
and can be combined with yet other polysyllabic words, such as
"adjudicatory" or "legislative." While such phrases sound impressive, we
may find it difficult to exercise our critical faculties while mouthing so many
syllables, just as some may find it hard to walk while chewing gum.
By now the seductive phrase "legislative jurisdiction" has been used so
often that it has acquired an aura of reality. After entering a first appearance
in David Dudley Field's Draft Outlines of an International Code,3 3 it has become a
30. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 22, 23, 26-27.
31. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 571-72, 595-96 (La. 1827).
32. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 24.
33. See D. FIELD, DRAFT OUTLINES OF AN INTENATIONAL CODE arts. 307-14 (1872).
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favorite of those who attempt to reduce the law of multistate transactions to
black-letter rules. Joseph Beale popularized the phrase by according rules of
legislative jurisdiction a prominent place in the Restatement of Conflicts.3 4
While the rest of Beale's intellectual edifice lies in shambles, that particular
concept has retained its popularity. Its name has changed (the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law speaks of "jurisdiction to prescribe" 3 5) but the
underlying idea has remained the same: A state has "power" to deal with
transactions that have a sufficient nexus with the state. Notwithstanding the
near universal acceptance of this notion, there are reasons to question its
usefulness. The term suggests an analogy where none may exist, for whether
a court can take a case is a rather different question from what law the court
will apply if it does so. Also, the word "jurisdiction" conjures up territorial
limits, whereas "law" lacks a spatial dimension. More important yet, so many
principles of prescriptive jurisdiction have been proffered that inevitably there
will be much overlap. Accordingly, instead of resolving conflicts, the notion
of legislative jurisdiction provokes them.
The Restatements of Foreign Relations Law show that "jurisdiction to
prescribe" is a poor problem solver, for the Restatements need a deus ex
machina to undo conflicts created by that very concept. The Restatements'
elaborate provisions 3 6 attempt to accomplish this feat by pushing the problem
to a different level, which is loosely called "comity." 3 7 That concept, in turn,
is not very helpful because, as Judge Porter observed, "comity is, and ever
must be, uncertain." 3 8 Just how uncertain it is becomes clear if one peruses
the factors thrown together, without assigning priorities, in the pertinent
provisions of the Foreign Relations Law Restatements. Those lists
demonstrate that comity is as nebulous as the public policy exception to which
classical conflicts law had to resort whenever the going got rough. The
purposes of these two fudge factors are of course diametrically opposed to
each other: while public policy invokes the lexfon to ward off undesirable
foreign law, comity is used to curtail unreasonable impositions of forum law.
But both concepts are equally unhelpful; while telling the decisionmaker to
exercise discretion, they fail to provide firm guidance on how to exercise it.
What Lorenzen said about public policy also applies to comity: That
"doctrine . . . ought to have been a warning that there was something the
matter with the reasoning upon which the rules to which it is the exception
were supposed to be based." 39
34. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 42-55, 59-70 (1934). The Restatement (Second)
of Conflict's black-letter rules eschew this term, but it does crop up in the comments. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 comments b-d, f (1971).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 6-19, 30-31, 33-36 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 401-02 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 40 (1965); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
37. Meesen, Antitrust Jurisdiction in Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784-89
(1984).
38. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 596 (La. 1827).
39. E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-14 (1947).
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V
CONCLUSION
The "methodological dead end" about which Professor Brilmayer
complains was reached once courts decided to dispel clashes of regulatory
policies by resorting to an implausible admixture of expansive legislative
jurisdiction and self-effacing comity. When foreign parties and their
governments object to what they consider an overly expansive application of
American regulatory laws, they are really less concerned about jurisdiction
and comity than the sanctions American courts mete out. In other words,
what actually conflicts are substantive concerns rather than territorial claims.
To deal with these concerns as if they were border disputes cannot help but
distort the decisionmaker's perspective. Moreover, the jurisdiction/comity
approach requires courts to evaluate conflicting domestic and foreign
interests, thus casting domestic judges in the role of international arbitrators.
For that role they are ill-equipped, and their pronouncements are bound to be
viewed with suspicion from abroad. Unless the decision comes out squarely in
favor of the foreign party, it is bound to be perceived as biased.
For these reasons, the solution to the problem of extraterritoriality will
remain elusive as long as the clash of regulatory policies is analyzed in terms
of legislative jurisdiction. That approach is not only misguided, it impedes
the search for workable solutions. Perhaps the problem is unsolvable by legal
means; perhaps hope lies with such soft approaches as exchanges of
information, consultation, the issuance of guidelines, and, conceivably, the
negotiation of treaties and conventions. In some areas, the difficulties may
even fade away as substantive policies begin to converge. Thus, several
foreign nations have begun to realize the evils of insider trading and,
conversely, the United States has become less zealous in imposing antitrust
morality at home and abroad. The controversies which persist cannot be laid
to rest by engaging in "rarefied theoretical observations" 40 that disregard the
substance of the issues arising from the attempts of nation states to regulate
transnational realities.
40. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 38.
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